June 8 - 9, 2006
06.08.06
What happens when we begin to regard mathematics as a kind of language? Does one ‘read’ numbers in any way similar to how one ‘reads’ words? Are numbers in need of interpretation? Why is it that a system of mathematics seems somehow more certain than a language? (Compare playing sudoku to filling in a crossword puzzle. At what point does one “know how to go on”?)
What Wittgenstein is trying to get us to realize is that when we read a passage we are not always nor necessarily “interpreting” the words in front of us. These are two different, although related proccesses and concepts. Compare how we use the phrases, “She read the poem (passage, letter, etc.)” and “She interpreted the poem...”
I will soon be ready to return to Heidegger’s concepts of understanding and interpretation.
In Section 32 of Being and Time, Heidegger seems to be saying that when we Articulate, we are expressing our understanding of ‘something as something’, and that understanding and interpretation precede phenomenologically articulation. I believe that this follows Kant’s move when he says that we must conceptualize an object as an object, or as a variable (‘X’). Yet it seems to me that this articulation of either our understanding or our interpretation (I am still unclear as to Heidegger’s distinction here) is redundant.
What needs to be clarified here is how terms such as ‘thing’ and ‘object’ are used. What I see is (A) these terms are used as variables or place-holders. They do not behave in any way as ‘signs’ that signify something - “This sign signifies something.” tells me nothing about the possible function of the sign, that is, its meaning. (B) To say “I see something as something,” or perhaps “I see something as itself,” again gives no useful information . In ordinary language, we would say “I see something,” or, more precisely, “I see a dog, car, tree, etc.”
What is the difference between a description and an explanation?
If we replace the sentence, “I see something as something,” with “I see the dog as a dog,” the absurdity of speaking this way becomes more apparent.
“The chalkboard appears green to me.” What do you mean? The chalkboard is green. (There is no pragmatic use for this sentence. Unless, of course, I am having an eye exam.)
06.09.06
The point is this: That word “meaning” is being used in a different way when we speak of “the meaning of a word,” as compared to when we are speaking of “the meaning of a sign.” And that means that the word “meaning” itself takes on a multiplicity of meanings. (But this does not mean that a word changes meanings like an actor changes costumes.)
But this is not enough; the differences in these meanings must be described.
“The Sunkist name signifies superior quality and good taste.” Notice how this sentence makes sense, even though philosophically speaking it is not true. The Sunkist name signifies more than the company that is named Sunkist. This leads me to ask whether “The Sunkist name signifies the company named Sunkist.” is even an appropriate use of the word.
Because this sentence tells me nothing new. (It is, absent the word ‘company’, tautological.)
For isn’t it also true to say, “The Sunkist name signifies the thing that is named Sunkist.” ?
It seems to me that if it can be proved that a system of signs derives its meaning from being contingent upon a pre-existing natural language, than it could be proved that a sign has meaning through its ‘pointing to something outside of itself’, whereas this is not necessarily true (or at least not true in the same sense) of words.
“She wore black as a sign of her mourning.” In order to understand this sign, one must have access to a pre-existing culture, one that is comprised of an infinite amount of organic language-games.
But from whence, then, do words get their meaning? Free yourself from the dichotomy of word/world.
Well, do trees have meaning? Do insects, do days and nights, mangos? What about pizzas and cars? (These are not yes or no questions. Remember that in every situation, it is still we who are speaking.)
What happens when we begin to regard mathematics as a kind of language? Does one ‘read’ numbers in any way similar to how one ‘reads’ words? Are numbers in need of interpretation? Why is it that a system of mathematics seems somehow more certain than a language? (Compare playing sudoku to filling in a crossword puzzle. At what point does one “know how to go on”?)
What Wittgenstein is trying to get us to realize is that when we read a passage we are not always nor necessarily “interpreting” the words in front of us. These are two different, although related proccesses and concepts. Compare how we use the phrases, “She read the poem (passage, letter, etc.)” and “She interpreted the poem...”
I will soon be ready to return to Heidegger’s concepts of understanding and interpretation.
In Section 32 of Being and Time, Heidegger seems to be saying that when we Articulate, we are expressing our understanding of ‘something as something’, and that understanding and interpretation precede phenomenologically articulation. I believe that this follows Kant’s move when he says that we must conceptualize an object as an object, or as a variable (‘X’). Yet it seems to me that this articulation of either our understanding or our interpretation (I am still unclear as to Heidegger’s distinction here) is redundant.
What needs to be clarified here is how terms such as ‘thing’ and ‘object’ are used. What I see is (A) these terms are used as variables or place-holders. They do not behave in any way as ‘signs’ that signify something - “This sign signifies something.” tells me nothing about the possible function of the sign, that is, its meaning. (B) To say “I see something as something,” or perhaps “I see something as itself,” again gives no useful information . In ordinary language, we would say “I see something,” or, more precisely, “I see a dog, car, tree, etc.”
What is the difference between a description and an explanation?
If we replace the sentence, “I see something as something,” with “I see the dog as a dog,” the absurdity of speaking this way becomes more apparent.
“The chalkboard appears green to me.” What do you mean? The chalkboard is green. (There is no pragmatic use for this sentence. Unless, of course, I am having an eye exam.)
06.09.06
The point is this: That word “meaning” is being used in a different way when we speak of “the meaning of a word,” as compared to when we are speaking of “the meaning of a sign.” And that means that the word “meaning” itself takes on a multiplicity of meanings. (But this does not mean that a word changes meanings like an actor changes costumes.)
But this is not enough; the differences in these meanings must be described.
“The Sunkist name signifies superior quality and good taste.” Notice how this sentence makes sense, even though philosophically speaking it is not true. The Sunkist name signifies more than the company that is named Sunkist. This leads me to ask whether “The Sunkist name signifies the company named Sunkist.” is even an appropriate use of the word.
Because this sentence tells me nothing new. (It is, absent the word ‘company’, tautological.)
For isn’t it also true to say, “The Sunkist name signifies the thing that is named Sunkist.” ?
It seems to me that if it can be proved that a system of signs derives its meaning from being contingent upon a pre-existing natural language, than it could be proved that a sign has meaning through its ‘pointing to something outside of itself’, whereas this is not necessarily true (or at least not true in the same sense) of words.
“She wore black as a sign of her mourning.” In order to understand this sign, one must have access to a pre-existing culture, one that is comprised of an infinite amount of organic language-games.
But from whence, then, do words get their meaning? Free yourself from the dichotomy of word/world.
Well, do trees have meaning? Do insects, do days and nights, mangos? What about pizzas and cars? (These are not yes or no questions. Remember that in every situation, it is still we who are speaking.)
posted by Joel | 4:57 PM
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