10.20.07
We recently read the essay “Two Dogmas of Empiricism,” by W.V. Quine, and a response to it, “In Defense of a Dogma”, by Grice and Strawson, for my Meaning and Skepticism class. In the handout, the professor enumerated some criticisms and clarifications for Quine's paper, and one of these criticisms was the following:
“Quine's attack on analyticity amounts to an attack on the very idea that a sentence could have a meaning. If it makes sense to ask “what does it mean?” of a sentence, then we can get a notion of sentence synonym:two statements are synonymous if and only if any true answer to the question “what does it mean?” asked of one of them is also a true answer to the same question asked of the other.”
And the next point reads:
“Quine moves from “we have not made satisfactory sense of x” to “x does not make sense.”
These criticisms express an old way of thinking about meaning, that is, assuming that a meaning is something that is unified, fixed, and stable. But what are we asking for when as for the meaning of a sentence? Here's an example lifted from John Searle's essay “What is a Speech Act?”, where Searle argues that intention alone cannot account for meaning: “Suppose I'm a US Soldier in WWII, and I'm captured by Italian troops. I want to get them to believe I'm a German officer and so release me, but I know very little German. All I remember is the following sentence: “Kennst du das Land, wo die Zitronen blühen?” which I know utter as if to tell them I'm a German officer.”
“What does 'Kennst du das Land, wo die Zitronen blühen' mean?” seems to have a specific meaning because it has a normal and recognizable use; asking for a translation. But is this question synonymous with either of these two: “What does he mean by 'Kennst du das Land, wo die Zitronen blühen' ?” or, “What does 'Do you know the land where the lemon trees bloom' mean?”
Examples like these live along the border lines of concepts, and considering them forces us to rethink the meaning of this word or that word, but not of language as a whole. The very acts of doubting and considering are contingent upon us already knowing the meanings of our words and sentences.
A²+B²=C² is not true. (But 3²+4²=5² is true.) That is to say, that it cannot be either true or false because what it is doing is not 'making a claim' but 'stating a rule'. Once we have decided upon this rule, we can use it as a measuring stick to aid us in deciding what is true and what is false. (Yes, this is very radical, and maybe not right.)
In one sense, what we call 'analytic statements' can never be true or false. The classical philosophical way to describe this is to say that certain statements are 'logically true', 'analytically true', or 'true in every possible world'. But if a statement cannot possibly be false, then it cannot either be considered a 'fact'. That is, the sentence “A bachelor is an unmarried male.” is not a fact. It is not true. It is what we mean by the word, 'bachelor'.
But can this also be said of the sentence, “An unmarried male is an unmarried male.”? Does “A bachelor is an unmarried male.” = “An unmarried male is an unmarried male.”? Under what possible circumstances would I possible need or want to say the sentence “An unmarried male is an unmarried male.”?
Something about the meaning of the word 'meaning': The sentence, “A squared plus B squared means C squared.” doesn't sound right. And neither does the sentence, “Bachelor equals unmarried male.”
But of course the Pythagorean Theorem is true! It's never been proved to be not true! But it's true in a different way. I mean, the sentences, “One foot is the same as twelve inches.”, and “One foot equals twelve inches.” are also both true.
In trying to posit a Theory of Meaning, if I believe that what I am trying to do is locate and identify the meaning of my words, my project will be doomed from the start.
There is no such thing as meaning, just as there is no such thing as language. If that's what you mean by meaning. What is the criteria for meaning? For meaning is not a quality of a sentence, like its grammar can be.
“Quine's attack on analyticity amounts to an attack on the very idea that a sentence could have a meaning. If it makes sense to ask “what does it mean?” of a sentence, then we can get a notion of sentence synonym:two statements are synonymous if and only if any true answer to the question “what does it mean?” asked of one of them is also a true answer to the same question asked of the other.”
And the next point reads:
“Quine moves from “we have not made satisfactory sense of x” to “x does not make sense.”
These criticisms express an old way of thinking about meaning, that is, assuming that a meaning is something that is unified, fixed, and stable. But what are we asking for when as for the meaning of a sentence? Here's an example lifted from John Searle's essay “What is a Speech Act?”, where Searle argues that intention alone cannot account for meaning: “Suppose I'm a US Soldier in WWII, and I'm captured by Italian troops. I want to get them to believe I'm a German officer and so release me, but I know very little German. All I remember is the following sentence: “Kennst du das Land, wo die Zitronen blühen?” which I know utter as if to tell them I'm a German officer.”
“What does 'Kennst du das Land, wo die Zitronen blühen' mean?” seems to have a specific meaning because it has a normal and recognizable use; asking for a translation. But is this question synonymous with either of these two: “What does he mean by 'Kennst du das Land, wo die Zitronen blühen' ?” or, “What does 'Do you know the land where the lemon trees bloom' mean?”
Examples like these live along the border lines of concepts, and considering them forces us to rethink the meaning of this word or that word, but not of language as a whole. The very acts of doubting and considering are contingent upon us already knowing the meanings of our words and sentences.
A²+B²=C² is not true. (But 3²+4²=5² is true.) That is to say, that it cannot be either true or false because what it is doing is not 'making a claim' but 'stating a rule'. Once we have decided upon this rule, we can use it as a measuring stick to aid us in deciding what is true and what is false. (Yes, this is very radical, and maybe not right.)
In one sense, what we call 'analytic statements' can never be true or false. The classical philosophical way to describe this is to say that certain statements are 'logically true', 'analytically true', or 'true in every possible world'. But if a statement cannot possibly be false, then it cannot either be considered a 'fact'. That is, the sentence “A bachelor is an unmarried male.” is not a fact. It is not true. It is what we mean by the word, 'bachelor'.
But can this also be said of the sentence, “An unmarried male is an unmarried male.”? Does “A bachelor is an unmarried male.” = “An unmarried male is an unmarried male.”? Under what possible circumstances would I possible need or want to say the sentence “An unmarried male is an unmarried male.”?
Something about the meaning of the word 'meaning': The sentence, “A squared plus B squared means C squared.” doesn't sound right. And neither does the sentence, “Bachelor equals unmarried male.”
But of course the Pythagorean Theorem is true! It's never been proved to be not true! But it's true in a different way. I mean, the sentences, “One foot is the same as twelve inches.”, and “One foot equals twelve inches.” are also both true.
In trying to posit a Theory of Meaning, if I believe that what I am trying to do is locate and identify the meaning of my words, my project will be doomed from the start.
There is no such thing as meaning, just as there is no such thing as language. If that's what you mean by meaning. What is the criteria for meaning? For meaning is not a quality of a sentence, like its grammar can be.
posted by Joel | 11:49 PM
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